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CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH

CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH
With regard to the search and seizure provision of the
fourth amendment' the constitutional distinction between
houses and cars enunciated in Carroll v. United States2 has
been exacerbated by two recent decisions of the Supreme
Court: Vale v. Louisiana3 and Chambers v. Maroney.4
In Vale the appellant, a known narcotics addict, was arrested on the front steps of his house by officers who had
established surveillance of the premises. He was convicted
on the admission into evidence of a quantity of narcotics
obtained from a rear bedroom of his house. The decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court.
In Chambers, the petitioner was arrested in an automobile
following a police radio alert and was convicted on evidence
taken from the car after the occupants had been removed
from the vehicle and it had been taken to the police station.
The conviction was upheld. In neither of these cases did the
arresting officers have search warrants.
It is recognized within the field of criminal procedure
that there are times in which the exigency of the situation
The fourth amendment provides: The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
4 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). This note is
confined to the fourth amendment aspects of these two
cases. In Vale, the issues of harmless error and whether
petitioner was afforded effective assistance of counsel were
also discussed.
1
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excuses failure to obtain a search warrant. If the search has
been consented tou or is incident to a lawful arrest" no warrant is needed; nor is a warrant required if the officer is in
"hot pursuit" of a suspect.1
Furthermore, no warrant is necessary when an emergency situation exists. If there is probable cause to believe
the goods no longer will be present when the officer returns
with the warrant, either because they have been destroyed 8
or have been removed from the jurisdiction, a lawful search
may be conducted without a warrant. The general rule has
been established, however, that searches conducted without
warrants are unreasonable unless "those who seek exemption
from the constitutional mandate [show] that the exigencies
of the situation made that course imperative."1 0

5 Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (to obtain government business petitioner agreed to permit inspection
of his accounts and records).
8 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (upheld the
search of desk and file cabinets in one room office though
there was time to obtain a search warrant and overruled
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) which allowed search only when obtaining a warrant would have
been impractical; both these decisions were modified by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) which held
the search must be confined to "the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.")
7 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (involving armed
robbery where police entered and searched suspect's home
vithin five minutes after the robbery had taken place).
8 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking blood
sample from petitioner accused of driving while Intoxicated).
9 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search and
seizure of automobile).
10 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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Both Vale and Chambers turn on the question of whether
or not the exigencies of the particular situation were sufficient to not require a search warrant.
In Vale policemen had the appellant's home under surveillance and while they were watching the home witnessed
what they believed to be an illegal narcotics transaction taking place on Vale's driveway. The officers subsequently arrested Vale on the front steps of his home, informed him
that they were going to search the house and advised him
of his Constitutional rights. After entering the front room
and ascertaining there was no other person in the house, the
police were about to commence their search when Vale's
mother and brother returned home.
The majority in Vale disagreed with the Louisiana Supreme Court holding the search was not within the immediate vicinity of the arrest and thus was not a search made
incident to arrest. The Court stated "if a search of a house
is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must
take place inside the house." Quoting from Agnello v. United
States, 2 the Court maintained that "[b]elief, however well
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant," 18 and further noted that this "basic rule has never
been questioned in this Court."' 4
Having established the situation dicl not qualify as a
search incident to a valid arrest, the Vale Court turned to
the exigencies which might permit a search without a warrant. The Court based its decision on two grounds, both
of which are attacked by dissenting Justices Black and Burger.
1 399 U.S. at 33-34.
12 269 U.S. 20, 23 (1925).
13 399 U.S. at 34.

14 399 U.S. at 34, quoting Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
487 n. 5 (1964).
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Initially, the majority ruled the Louisiana court erred in
holding the search valid because it involved easily disposable
narcotics. The record indicated the searchers had ascertained
that no one was in the house when they began their search,
the majority therefore maintained the emergency rationale
could not apply as the evidence was in no immediate danger
of being destroyed.
However, the dissent pointed out Vale's mother and
brother returned home before the fruitful search had been
executed and they were capable of destroying the evidence.
It is a general rule that the reasonableness of the search varies
with the circumstances"5 and the dissent believed the circumstances justified a search without a warrant. The dissent
added it made no difference whether the search was incidental to an arrest or not; the mere fact that the mother
and brother had arrived home placed this search under the
emergency exception. The majority observed the goods were
not in the process of destruction at the time of entry; the
dissent countered with the observation that contraband need
not be in the process of destruction for the rule to apply.
It would be sufficient, the dissent stated, if "[the] evidence
or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction". 10
In addition, the Vale majority leaned on the fact that the
officers had already procured two warrants for the appellant's
arrest; it pointed out there was "no reason . . . to suppose
17
it impracticable for them to obtain a search warrant as well.1

15 Compare Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) with
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Comment,
Search and Seizure of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest
for an Offense Other than a Traffic Violation, 31 Mo. L. REv.
436 (1966). See Comment, Interference With the Right to
Free Movements: Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51 CALi1.
L. REv. 907 (1963).
16 399 U.S. at 39 (dissenting opinion), quoting, Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
IT Id. at 35.
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The dissent argued, however, the arrest warrants were issued
because Vale's bond had been increased on two charges pending against him, not because of present misconduct. Thus,
the dissent believed that the officers would have had no
probable cause to obtain the warrants. The probable cause
did not arise until the officers saw what they believed to
be an illegal narcotics transaction minutes before they arrested Vale and conducted the search.
In Chambers, the Court distinguished Vale by saying
the same consequences of Chambers may not follow when
there is unforseeable cause to search a house. The court
justified the distinction by adding "....

as Carroll . .. held,

for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars."1 8
The facts of the Chambers case were somewhat different
from those of Vale. A Gulf service station was robbed and
one of the attendants was instructed to place the money in
a right hand glove. Two teenagers, who witnessed the happenings, reported the incident to the police and a police
bulletin was issued describing the car and the clothing of
the robbers. Within the hour, a car fitting the description
given by the teenagers was stopped and the clothes of the occupants matched the description given by the service station
attendant. The occupants were arrested and the car was
driven to the police station. The first search of the car revealed nothing; but after interrogating the occupants, the
police conducted a thorough search of the car which revealed
revolvers, a right hand glove filled with change, and credit
cards bearing the name of a service station attendant who
had been robbed the previous week.
As in Vale, the Chambers Court held the arresting officers
had probable cause to make the arrest, but the search could
18

399 U.S. at 52.
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not be justified as being incident to the arrest. This search
was made at the police station some time after the arrest
and "[o]nce the accused is under arrest and in custody, then
a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply
not incident to the arrest."'19 Therefore, the Court proceeded
as it did in Vale, by examining the exigencies of the particular situation to determine if a search could be sustained
without a warrant. Again, it was a matter of probable cause
as to whether an emergency arose such that if a search was
.not made at that moment, the evidence would be destroyed
or moved out of the jurisdiction. Whereas in Vale the Court
held that there was not probable cause that the goods would
be destroyed, in Chambers it felt that the search was justified.
In Chambers there is little doubt there existed probable
cause at the time of the arrest. The majority of the Court
maintained that since the probable cause factor was present
at the arrest, it continued until the car was safely at the
station house, the occupants removed, one fruitless search
had taken place, the occupants interrogated and the car
searched a second time. The majority stated:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of the car
should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the 'greater'.
But which is the 'greater' and 'lesser' intrusion is
itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional
purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other
hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant. Given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
. . . The probable-cause factor still obtained at the
19 Id. at 47, quoting, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
367 (1944).
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station house and so did the mobility of the car
unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial
of its use to
20
anyone until a warrant is secured.
There are two cases which must be mentioned in order
to understand the distinction between the majority and the
dissent in this case. While the dissent relied on Preston v.
22
United States21, the majority relied on Cooper v. California
and attempted to distinguish it from Preston. In Preston,
occupants of a car were arrested for vagrancy and their
car was impounded upon their arrest. The car was not
seached at the time of the arrest, but was towed to a garage
where a search produced enough evidence to convict the
petitioner and others of conspiracy to rob a federally insured
bank. A unanimous Court reversed, stating ".

.

. since the

men were under arrest at the police station and the car was
in police custody at a garage [there was no] danger that
the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction."
Thus a warrantless search failed to "meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." 24 Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Chambers, construed this statement to "...
have been based on the premise that the more reasonable
course was for the police to retain custody of the car for
the short time necessary to obtain a warrant."2 5
On the other hand, Cooper involved the warrantless
seizure of heroin from the glove compartment of the petitioner's impounded car after the petitioner was arrested
for a narcotics violation. A five to four majority of the
Court upheld the conviction. An attempt was made by the
majority to distinguish Cooper from Preston by pointing
20

399 U. S. at 51-52.

21 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
22

386 U.S. 58 (1967).

2

376 U. S. at 367.

24 Id.

25 399

U.S. at 65.
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out that the police seized the car in Cooper pursuant to state
law and were required to hold it until forfeiture proceedings were terminated some four months after it was lawfully
seized. 26 The Court held it would have been unreasonable
to rule the police could not search the car, even for their
own protection, if they were to retain it in their garage. The
Cooper majority interpreted the Preston case as being incident to arrest and thus inapplicable in the Cooper situation.
Although Preston was decided predominantly on that basis,
Justice Harlan in Chambers pointed out the case was not
strictly limited as being one of a search incident to an arrest.
He substantiates his conclusion by pointing to that statement in Preston in which the Court attempted to decide if
the situation was "... . such as to fall within any of the exceptions to the constitutional rule that a search warrant must
be had before a search may be made. '27 Justice Harlan added
however, "[f]idelity to this established principle requires that,
where the exceptions are made to accommodate the exigencies
of particular situations, those exceptions be no broader than
necessitated by the circumstances presented.2 8 Thus Harlan
feels discarding the Preston principle for the ruling in Chambers which purports to follow Cooper is at odds with the
fourth amendment.
It is difficult to reconcile these two cases unless one
accepts the distinction in Carroll that there is a constitutional difference between cars and houses and extends that
distinction to include cars and houses per se. When one examines the exigencies in Vale and in Chambers and considers
the ruling and the dissents, no other conclusion logically can
be reached. In the Vale case, where the mother and brother
26

27
28

California state law required the seizure of a car after an
arrest for narcotics violation. Law of June 22, 1955, ch.
1209 §1, [1955]. Calif. Laws 1955 (repealed 1967).
399 U.S. at 65 (dissenting opinion), quoting, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
399 U.S. at 61 (dissenting opinion).
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could have destroyed the contraband evidence had the officers
left to obtain a warrant, the court held the search invalid.
In the Chambers case, where the car was at the station and
the occupants under arrest, the same Court, sitting the same
day, upheld the search. Logically, it would appear that the
exigencies would dictate opposite conclusions. The distinction perceived in Carroll provides some logic for these holdings; however, that distinction does not go far enough. The
Court in Carroll was concerned with the admissability of
contraband liquor seized in a warrantless search of a car
on the highway. The Court stated:
. . . the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has
been construed, practically since the beginning of the
Government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or 29jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
Had the Court in Chambers not chosen to justify its decision on the basis of Carroll, one validly could assume that
the Court was recognizing a distinction between the two enclosures. However, there remains some doubt because Carroll
and the cases following have justified the distinction by
stating if the goods are left in the car there is a danger of
their being transported out of the jurisdiction. In Chambers,
there was no danger of the car's being moved at that time.
Nor did the Court choose to dismiss the case solely on the
Cooper holding that the police should have been afforded an
opportunity to search the car for their own protection, albeit
the time element may have been a deciding factor in Cooper.

20

267 U.S. at 153.
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